Review of Alexander Ward's The Internationalists
The Fight to Restore American Foreign Policy After Trump
It’s not that popular to show trust in and express gratitude for the American Free Press these days. The long and grinding war to discredit journalism for political gain has been pretty successful over the last few cycles. To be fair, the institution hasn’t helped itself. From cable news sensationalism to a developing business model chasing clicks and shares, there’s more than enough reason to be frustrated by seeking the signal through the noise. The hard reality though is that a democracy can’t live without it. Alexander Ward’s new book The Internationalists: The Fight to Restore American Foreign Policy After Trump is an example of why. Be warned, if you’re looking to add to the ever growing pile of Trump damning reveals, this is not the book for you.
Ward follows the arc of Biden National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan from election night 2016 to the present day, from the dawn of the Trump administration to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. His core thesis, as described by tracking Sullivan’s evolving foreign policy positions, is that Donald Trump’s election represented a watershed event in American foreign policy. Beyond the noise and theatrics of politics, the signal was that post WWII policy of America may have driven global peace, economic growth and prosperity, but it didn’t really do much for middle class Americans. On the contrary, it moved high paying jobs and corporate investment outside our borders. Moreover, America’s longstanding policy of nation building had failed at great cost and consequence.
Lost in the America First rhetoric and the political theatrics of Trumpism was a message that reached the American electorate clearly. A retread of the last 30 years of American policy wouldn’t, and didn’t, win in 2016. What did win in 2020 was a message of stability to a pandemic weary America that had tired of a polarizing Executive that did little to build bridges to anywhere, particularly at home but not exclusively. But the Biden win was not a referendum on the Trump driven American foreign policy shift though. Ward’s point is that much of what Trump started Biden continued, with a meaningful difference; a commitment to rebuilding relationships with our long standing allies.
Ward takes us through the three major foreign policy events that marked the first term of the Biden Administration; the withdrawal from Afghanistan; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in Gaza. Of the three, the latter two are still far too dynamic at the moment to assess the policy impact. Things have and will continue to change day by day. But the themes for all three are clearly stated.
In Afghanistan, President Biden was committed to leaving at all costs. In this there was no daylight between the Trump and Biden administrations. While attempts were made to work with allies on the withdrawal, they weren’t onboard. Neither were the generals. But Biden wouldn’t be dissuaded. While the esthetics and near term outcomes seemed disastrous at the time, we’re hard pressed to find many American voters who wish we still had a significant military presence in Afghanistan. This was a decision for the American people. All else mattered far less.
In Gaza, Israel finds a resolute ally in the Biden administration. And while the near past events of the conflict have developed too late to get the most current treatment by Ward in the book, it’s clear that both President Biden’s commitment to Israel and longstanding policy of supporting allies in broad daylight while making demands on them in the shadows is driving current U.S. foreign policy decisions. This opens up the Administration to criticism from within their own party as the humanitarian crisis looms larger. As I write this, Iran has launched missiles into Israel. The Biden Administration now faces a broader question of avoiding escalation into regional if not global conflict. Allies become even more paramount.
In Ukraine, Ward highlights the most complete version of what looks like a foreign policy success that highlights the Biden doctrine. Again though, we’re too close to understand the long term implications. There are a few clear things though. The U.S. was mostly alone in understanding the magnitude of Putin’s threat. Even Ukraine’s President Zelensky seemed asleep at the switch. That said, the Biden Administration invested heavily in bringing NATO allies along on the journey even if they were reluctant to believe them. And while no one was willing to do much until the tanks rolled across Ukraine’s eastern border, the response from the West once they did was coordinated, significant and critical to avoid a collapse of the Ukrainian forces in the months after the initial Russian advance bogged down. This is the Biden doctrine in its fullest; Collaboration with NATO allies, supply chain competition, sanctions. No boots on the ground. No direct action towards Russia. Nothing that would put Americans at risk…foreign policy with teeth facing our adversaries, not the American people.
When tested, the Biden Foreign policy doctrine yielded mixed results in the short term. But its shape had taken form. What was clear was that America could no longer stop things from happening simply by weighing in or threatening action. Russia and China were going to act in their own interest and wars were no longer off the table. America needed to be aligned in dependency and strength with our longstanding allies, not our adversaries. The world was not going to slowly march to a liberal world order. After four years, the arc of the Biden foreign policy doctrine followed Jake Sullivan into a speech at Brookings Institute.
Sullivan:
“A shifting global economy left many working Americans and their communities behind. A financial crisis shook the middle class. A pandemic exposed the fragility of our supply chains. A changing climate threatened lives and livelihoods. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underscored the risk of over-dependence.”
Ward on Sullivan:
Implicitly, Sullivan said the main assumptions undergirding America’s foreign economic policy had been wrong for decades. China, and the Washington belief that liberalized markets would eventually lead to democracy within the halls of power in Beijing, was the most glaring example.
The Biden Administration’s most dynamic foreign policy mind, supporting an American President that had spent a lifetime in Washington working on an outdated and misguided model of American foreign policy, declared that the error needed to be corrected. Fukayama was wrong. History hadn’t ended. On the contrary the world of Bruno Maçaēs’ Dawn of Eurasia and History Has Begun and Rodrik’s Global Economic Trilemma was here. Supply chain wars, shooting wars, cyberwars all wound together in a grand global integrated competition. Trump’s America First was necessary but not sufficient. The new game required the old alliances to win. And that’s where we find ourselves.
On Wednesday April 17th I’m hosting an online discussion with the author Alex Ward. For details on how to attend, click the link below or message me direct.